2] The early adoption of hybrid corn before 1937 can be better explained by a sustained propaganda campaign conducted by the U.S. Department of Agriculture at the direction of the Secretary of Agriculture, Henry Agard Wallace. The Department's campaign echoed that of the commercial seed companies. The most prominent hybrid seed company, Pioneer Hi-Bred Company, was founded by Wallace and he retained a financial interest while serving as Secretary.
more famous, at least among plant scientists, than Griliches's logistic, the rise in corn yields per acre is employed to suggest that hybrid corn was responsible for a biotechnological revolution that abruptly ended a sustained period of "biological stasis." Figure 3 displays the "hockey stick" graph reproduced dozens of time in the scientific literature. 5 The chart plots USDA statistics on corn yields per acre dating back to 1866.
There was a remarkable stability in yields with no discernable trend before 1936. I say "perhaps too casually," because the introduction of hybrids was also accompanied by the increase use of synthetic nitrogen fertilizers, increased planting densities, and the adoption and improvements in planting and harvesting machinery.
However, these developments were intimately interrelated. One of the hybrid traits introduced improved the plant's ability to absorb nitrogen fertilizers and indeed the use of fertilizer was required to reach the potential of the hybrids. Similarly, the increased planting densities were possible only because of traits that reduced the plant's requirements for full sunlight and that increased its resistance to lodging -the tendency of the plant to lie down or fall over when beaten down by the wind. Even then high density was possible only with the heavy application of fertilizer. Increased planting 5 As an indication of how ubiquitously Figure 3 appears, I note that a standard textbook on corn for plant scientists [Smith, Betrán, and Runge 2004] reproduces a version of this chart four times in four separate chapters [Troyer 2004 6 Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [2008] have challenged the notion of a biological stasis before 1936. They view the stability of yields before 1936 as due to a balance of conflicting forces some of which would depress yields and counterbalancing ones that worked to raise yields.
densities required the abandonment of the horse and the horse-wide path between the rows of corn. Thus the adoption of machinery was a necessary component for achieving the full potential of hybrid corn. 7 Since hybrid seed, synthetic fertilizer, and gasoline tractors were a necessary triad, it is not really possible to partition responsibility for the yield increases among them.
The continuing improvement in the performance of hybrids after their initial introduction is an important part of the story. 3] Later adopters of hybrid seed were motivated by the drought resistance of one experimental hybrid variety discovered during the drought of 1934 and vividly 7 On several of these points see: Castleberry, Crum, and Krull [1984: 33] .
demonstrated during the drought of 1936. The eventual improvement of yields as newer varieties were introduced and the imitative force of "collective logic" explain the continuation and acceleration of the process. Given the required capital investments in fertilizer tanks and tractors and the inability to save and plant one's own seed, adoption tended to be irreversible.
4] The biological revolution in corn, commonly associated with the introduction of hybrid varieties, was not a unique phenomenon. Indeed, I find remarkably similar "hockey stick graphs" for the yields per acre in cotton, wheat, tobacco, oats, potatoes, and barley. The simultaneous increase in the yields of so many different crops during this period is more properly attributed to the discovery of an economical process for synthesizing ammonia and the consequent increase in the use of synthetic fertilizers.
The Iowa Corn Yield Tests and Hybrid Superiority
Griliches assumed that hybrid corn had an economically significant and unambiguous superiority over open-pollinated corn from the time it was first introduced.
He reported that this superiority could be gauged by a 15-to 20-percent higher yield achieved with hybrid corn over the traditional open-pollinated varieties. Griliches also suggested that this relative advantage applied to both high-and low-yielding soils, good years and bad [Griliches 1957b: 516-517; 1958: 421] [Griliches, Thesis, 1957a: 56-57] . These considerations may make the Iowa test results an exaggerated estimate of the absolute advantage, but all that is needed for Griliches's disequilibrium model is an estimate of the relative advantage. Elsewhere Griliches argued that the relative advantage was independent of the level of yield per acre. Moreover, to the extent that the test results exaggerated the absolute gain, they bias the farmer's calculus decision toward adoption, and thus they would bias the argument against the claim I make in this paper that the hybrid advantage was not large enough to encourage early adoptions.
For the Iowa tests the state was partitioned into 12 districts, shown in the inset map in Figure 5 . A volunteer farmer from each district, who was also a member of the Iowa Crop Improvement Association, planted several varieties in adjacent fields and employed a uniform cultivation practice to raise them to maturity. At harvest, the yields were measured separately for each variety and reported back to the Experiment Station.
The Table displayed to use the scientific term. As we will see, however, hybrid vigor is not the same as economic superiority.
Hybrid Vigor
American corn, or more properly, "maize" (Zea mays, L.) is native to North America.
11 It originated in Mexico where farmers cultivated it for millennia, gradually improving the plant by the selection for genetically-based traits. Before the development of hybrid corn the seed used for farm-planted corn was the result of natural crosspollination. Under these conditions, corn is said to be "open-pollinated." Pollen, produced by the corn plant's tassels, is released and carried on the air. Some of the pollen typically reaches the cornsilks (the "ear shoots," which are the stigmas of the female flower) of one or more nearby plants. The geminating pollen tube grows down the silk and fertilizes the egg cell, thereby starting the growth of a seed. In principle each seed on an ear of corn could have a different male parent. The fraction of corn seeds set by self-pollination is known to be very low. If this fertilization process is left to the wind, selective breeding consists of choosing individual ears of corn on the basis of 11 The sources for this and the next several paragraphs are many, but the science is well-known so a detailed list of sources will be omitted. References to the names and historical dates can be found in Duvick [2001] . For a history of corn varieties (germplasm), see Troyer [2004] . Much of the science is elaborated in Smith, Betrán, and Runge [2004] . The most popular open-pollinated variety at the time that the first hybrids were introduced was Reid's Yellow Dent. This was an accidental hybrid between a reddish semi-gourd and a yellow flint. The story is told by Russell Lord [1947: 147] and Troyer [2004] .
that were to be crossed involved laborious hand pollination and these parent lines were so depressed by inbreeding that their seed yields were extremely low, making the input costs to large-scale production prohibitive.
The problem of producing hybrid seed that the farmer could afford was further compounded by the need to plant freshly-made hybrid seed each year. If the seeds of an inbred hybrid were planted, the yields achieved the following season would drop significantly because seed from a hybrid field would suffer from inbreeding depression [Jugenheimer 1939: 18-19 ].
The practical problem was solved in 1918 by Donald F. Jones. He found that a 
Henry Agard Wallace and Hybrid Hype
The puzzle then is why some adventurous farmers were willing to adopt hybrid corn before its economic superiority was demonstrated by controlled tests. My suggestion has two parts: (1) there was an aggressive marketing campaign launched by the commercial seed companies directed at potential adopters, and (2) Another obstacle that had to be overcome was the reluctance of many farmers to abandon their reliance on their own home-grown seed and instead entertain a visit by, and the commercial pitch of, the traveling seed salesman. The role of the salesman was not so much to educate the farmer -the genetics of inbred-hybrid crosses and the "magic" of heterosis exceeded the common-sense knowledge of most farmers and indeed of most seed salesman. The claims of superiority had to be accepted, if they were, on faith. It was a particularly sore point with many farmers that seeds saved from a hybrid crop could not themselves be planted the next season with any hope of success. So, old habits were challenged. A commitment to hybrid seed was tantamount to an agreement to deal with the seed salesman every subsequent year as well as the current year. And that commitment meant that the farmer's skill in selecting seed corn from his own crop, a skill which many took great pride in, would be no longer needed or esteemed [Fitzgerald 1993 ].
Pioneer Hi-Bred designed a sophisticated marketing plan to address these problems. Seed salesmen working for Wallace offered to provide the reluctant farmer 
Drought and Research
The eventual success of hybrid corn was due, first, to a tipping event and then to the selfreinforcing momentum of biotechnology. The factor which acted to tip the balance in favor of hybrid adoption was paradoxically another disaster to bedevil corn farmers in the 1930s. As if the Depression, with its devastating impact on agricultural prices were not enough, there were catastrophic droughts in 1934 and 1936. An index of the severity of these droughts is the fraction of the crop planted which was harvested. In Iowa and in the country overall, thirty to forty percent of the acreage planted was so devastated by drought that it was not worth harvesting. In Nebraska and Kansas the losses were nearly total. The data for Iowa are presented in Figure 7 .
What the droughts starkly demonstrated was that the relative yield of hybrid corn was greatest when the absolute yields were generally depressed. Figure 8 reveals the relationship using, once again, the Iowa Corn Yield Test results to illustrate the correlation. In the extreme drought conditions of the mid 1930s, the yield differences between the new and traditional varieties were stark. Edward May, President of the May Seed Company, recalled:
Yield differences became plainly evident in 1936, which was also a severe drouth year in Iowa. At this time nearly all farmers who were testing hybrid seed corn planted only a limited acreage. Yields of hybrids under these conditions in many areas of the state were approximately double the yields of other corn grown on the farm. The results were so convincing that it marked the end of the vast efforts of initial adoption [May 1949: 514] . Farmers might have switched to hybrid corn out of fear of continued drought, but soon the genetic advance in hybrid corn made open-pollinated corn obsolete even though the price of hybrid seed was high and a farmer using it would need to purchase fresh seed each season. This genetic improvement was achieved thanks to continuing research funded by the seed companies using retained earnings generated by soaring sales and high prices.
Wallace believed that his hybrid revolution would have collapsed without a continuing, well-financed, research effort [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148] . Research by the federal government also played a supporting role. 20 The research in both sectors was closely co-coordinated. According to Sprague [1945: 101] there was unrestricted interchange of ideas and seed stock between government researchers and the private companies. Most observers agree that the for-profit research was the driving partner of the private-federal joint effort after 1937 [Griliches 1958: 420-421 and Table 1, p. 424; Duvick 2001: 71; Fuglie, Ballenger, et al 1996 : 45, Fernandez-Cornejo 2004 ].
Wallace claimed that his company spent more money on corn research than the USDA and the state experiment stations combined [Culver and Hyde 2000: 148] .
Ironically, the drought of 1934 was, in part, responsible for the remarkable improvement in hybrid development seen thereafter. One of the farmers that Hi-Bred What we have, then, is a story of the diffusion of hybrid corn that is more complex and more interesting than the one usually told by Griliches-inspired plant scientists [Griliches, Science, 1960] . Rather than disequilibrium transition slowed by information imperfections that were gradually overcome by commercial advertising and 
Ammonia and Tractors
I might close on this note, but there is one point worth adding. This takes us back to Figure 2 and the idea that the yield advances after 1935 can be attributed exclusively to the adoption of hybrid corn and its continuing improvement. Certainly the "hockey-stick graph" displayed in Figure 2 is an almost irresistible piece of evidence. Yet an important curiosity, not reported in the academic literature on corn yields, is that the same hockeystick profile with the same transition date is seen in most other crops. Wheat, cotton, potatoes, barley, tobacco, oats; they all display the same time-series profile. See Figure   10 .
Hybridization cannot explain similar spurts in yield per acre in these other crops.
Plant breeders have yet to successfully develop commercial hybrids for any of them. Nonetheless, on heavily-cropped land, a shortage of fixed nitrogen can become the bottleneck that prevents crop yields from being sustained year after year. Thus the invention of a process to synthesize ammonia by Fritz Haber and the development of a commercially-viable ammonia manufacturing process by Carl Bosch shortly before World War I deserve much of the credit for the explosion of crop yields across so many 21 Hybridization is technically feasible for many field crops other than corn but is generally-speaking not economical [Fuglie, Ballenger, et al 1996: 34] . Sorghum and sugar beets are two exceptions. However, many of the flower and vegetable seeds sold to individual consumers are hybrids. For an account of the unsuccessful effort to develop hybrid wheat see Knudson and Ruttan [1988] .
crops after the mid-1930s. 22 For their work, Haber was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1918;
Bosch received his in 1931.
As a consequence of these discoveries, commercial fertilizers became considerably cheaper and their use exploded at precisely the time when the yield per acre in crop after crop began to rise. Indeed, the graph of commercial fertilizer use displayed as Figure 11 displays its own hockey-stick profile.
There is widespread agreement that the adoption and increasing improvement of hybrid corn was accompanied by increasing application of nitrogen fertilizers [Shaw and Durost 1965: Table 21, p. 39; Johnson 1960] . It was also accompanied by the introduction of the tractor and increased planting densities. 23 But these were not independent influences. Hybrid corn varieties were developed to take maximum advantage of fertilizer and the increased planting densities would not have been possible unless the hybrid varieties could thrive when planted so close together. Increased planting densities required the gasoline-powered tractor as well as the heavy application of fertilizer. Where horse-drawn equipment was employed, reducing the space between corn rows was limited by the physical space required for the horse.
The appealing search for a mono-causal story for the yield advance in corn, I
argue, is wrong headed. The corn yield advance is certainly due to unique circumstances in the industry, but the introduction of hybrid corn is only one of them. Moreover, the story we would tell for corn cannot be generalized to other crops. Each crop requires its own detailed study. Commercial fertilizer is, perhaps, the only common element. 22 The timing of these discoveries was important since synthetic ammonia was used by the Germans in the production of explosives and thus probably prolonged the war. Haber also played a major role in the development and deployment of poison gas for the Germans during the war. There are two excellent biographies of Haber [Stoltzenberg 2004 and Charles 2005] . 23 In 1939 only 9 percent of the corn was planted using tractor planters in the Corn Belt states. In 1946 the percentage had jumped to 44 percent and 82 percent of the acreage was cultivated with tractors and 64 percent of the acreage was harvested with mechanical corn pickers [USDA, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, 1949: Tables 19-20, pp. 58-59] . See Alan Olmstead and Paul Rhode [2001] for a general discussion of the diffusion and impact of the tractor. 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 1958 1960 Historical Track Records, April 2004 , p.19. 1932 1934 1936 1938 1940 1942 1944 1946 1948 1950 1952 1954 1956 
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